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Abstract
We study games in which the decision to exercise an option is a signal of private information
to outsiders, whose beliefs a¤ect the utility of the decision maker. Signaling incentives dis-
tort the timing of exercise, and the direction of distortion depends on whether the decision
makers utility increases or decreases in outsidersbelief about the payo¤ from exercise. In
the former case, signaling incentives erode the value of the option to wait and speed up
option exercise, while in the latter case option exercise is delayed. We demonstrate the
models implications through four corporate nance settings: investment under managerial
myopia, venture capital grandstanding, investment under cash ow diversion, and product
market competition.
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The real options approach to investment and other corporate nance decisions has be-
come an increasingly important area of research in nancial economics. The main under-
lying concept is that an investment opportunity is valuable not only because of associated
cash ows but also because the decision to invest can be postponed. As a result, when mak-
ing the investment decision, one must take into account both the direct costs of investment
and the indirect costs of foregoing the option to invest in the future. The applications of
the real options framework have become quite broad.1
One aspect that is typically ignored in standard models is that most real option exercise
decisions are made under asymmetric information: the decision maker is better informed
about the value of the option than outsiders. Given the importance of asymmetric infor-
mation in corporate nance, it is useful to understand how it a¤ects real option exercise
decisions.2 In this paper, we explore this issue by incorporating information asymmetry into
real options modeling. We consider a setting that is exible enough to handle a variety of
real world examples, characterize the e¤ects of asymmetric information, and then illustrate
the model using four specic applications: investment under managerial myopia, venture
capital grandstanding, investment under cash ow diversion by the manager, and product
market entry decisions by two asymmetrically informed rms.
In the presence of asymmetric information, the exercise strategy of a real option is an
important information transmission mechanism. Outsiders learn information about the
decision maker from observing the exercise (or lack of exercise) of the option, and thereby
change their assessment of the decision maker. In turn, because the decision maker is
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aware of this information transmission e¤ect, the option exercise strategy is shaped to
take advantage of it. To provide further motivation for the study, consider two examples
of option exercise decisions, where asymmetric information and signaling are likely to be
especially important.
Example 1. Delegated investment decisions in corporations. In most modern
corporations, the owners of the rm delegate investment decisions to the manager. There is
substantial asymmetric information: the manager is typically much better informed about
the underlying cash ows of the investment project than the shareholders. In this context,
the managers decision when to invest transmits information about the projects net present
value (NPV). While in some agency settings the manager may want to signal higher project
values to boost her future compensation, in other agency settings the manager may want to
signal a lower project NPV to divert more value for her own private consumption. In either
setting, however, the manager will take this information transmission e¤ect into account
when deciding when to invest.
Example 2. Exit decisions in the venture capital industry. In the venture
capital (VC) industry, there is substantial asymmetric information about the value of the
funds portfolio companies, since the VC rm that manages the fund has a much better
information about the funds portfolio companies than the funds outside investors. In this
context, the rms decision when to sell a portfolio company transmits information about
its value, and hence impacts outsiders inferences of the rms investment skill. Because
investor inferences of the rms investment skill impact the rms future fund-raising ability,
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the rm will take this information transmission e¤ect into account when deciding when to
sell a portfolio company.
We call such interactions real options signaling games, and study them in detail in this
paper. We begin our study with a general model of option exercise under asymmetric
information. Specically, we consider a decision maker whose payo¤ from option exer-
cise is comprised of two components. The rst component is simply some fraction of the
projects payo¤. The second component, which we call the belief component, depends on
outsidersassessment of the decisionmakers type. The decisionmakers type determines
the projects NPV and is the private information of the decision maker. Our central in-
terest is in separating equilibria equilibria in which the decision maker reveals her type
through the option exercise strategy.3 We characterize a separating equilibrium of the gen-
eral model, and prove that under standard regularity conditions it exists and is unique. The
equilibrium is determined by a di¤erential equation given by local incentive compatibility.
We show that the implied option exercise behavior di¤ers signicantly from traditional
real options models. The rst-best (symmetric information) exercise threshold is never
an equilibrium outcome, except for the most extreme type: because the decisionmakers
utility depends on outsidersbelief about the decisionmakers type, there is an incentive
to deviate from the symmetric information threshold to mimic a di¤erent type and thereby
take advantage of outsiders incorrect belief. While information asymmetry distorts the
timing of option exercise, the direction of the e¤ect is ambiguous and depends on the
nature of the interactions between the decision maker and outsiders.
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The rst contribution of our paper is the characterization of the direction of distortion.
We show that the direction of distortion depends on a simple and intuitive characteristic:
the derivative of the decisionmakers payo¤ with respect to the belief of outsiders about
the decisionmakers type. If the decision maker benets from outsiders believing that
the projects value is higher than in reality, then signaling incentives lead to earlier option
exercise than in the case of symmetric information. In contrast, if the decision maker
benets from outsiders believing that the projects value is lower than in reality, then
the option is exercised later than in the case of symmetric information. The intuition
underlying this result comes from the fact that earlier exercise is a signal of the better
quality of the project. For example, other things equal, an oil-producing rm decides to
drill an oil well at a lower oil price threshold when it believes that the quality of the oil
well is higher. Because of this, if the decision maker benets from outsiders believing
that the projects quality is higher (lower) than in reality, she has incentives to deviate
from the rst-best exercise threshold by exercising the option marginally earlier (later) and
attempting to fool the market into believing that the projects quality is higher (lower)
than in reality. In equilibrium, the exercise threshold will be lowered (raised) to the point
at which the decisionmakers marginal costs of ine¢ ciently early (late) exercise exactly
o¤set her marginal benets from fooling outsiders. Importantly, outsiders are rational.
They are aware that the decision maker shapes the exercise strategy to a¤ect their belief.
As a result, in equilibrium outsiders always correctly infer the private information of the
agent. However, even though the private information is always revealed in equilibrium,
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signal-jamming occurs: the exercise thresholds of all types, except for the most extreme
type, are di¤erent from the rst-best case and are such that no type has an incentive to
fool outsiders.
The second contribution of our paper is illustrating the general model with four cor-
porate nance applications that put additional structure on the belief component of the
decisionmakers payo¤: investment under managerial myopia, venture capital grandstand-
ing, investment under cash ow diversion by the manager, and product market entry deci-
sions by two asymmetrically informed rms. The rst application we consider is a timing
analog to the myopia model of Stein (1989). We consider a public corporation, in which
the investment decision is delegated to a manager, who has superior information about
the projects NPV. As in Stein (1989), the manager is myopic in that she cares not only
about the long-term performance of the company but also about the short-term stock price.
The timing of investment reveals the managers private information about the project and
thereby a¤ects the stock price. As a result, the manager invests ine¢ ciently by exercising
her investment option too early in an attempt to fool the market into overestimating the
projects NPV and thereby inating the current stock price.
The second application deals with the VC industry. As discussed in Gompers (1996),
younger VC rms often take companies public earlier than older VC rms to establish a
reputation and successfully raise capital for new funds. Gompers terms this phenomenon
grandstandingand suggests that inexperienced VC rms employ early timing of initial
public o¤erings (IPOs) as a signal of their ability to form higher-quality portfolios. We
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formalize this idea in a two-stage model of VC investment. An inexperienced VC rm
invests limited partnersmoney in the rst round and then decides when to take its portfolio
company public. Limited partners update their estimate of the general partners investment-
picking ability by observing when the decision to take the portfolio company public is made
and use this estimate when deciding how much to invest in the second round. Because the
amount of second round nancing is positively related to the limited partnersestimate of
the general partners ability, the general partner has an incentive to fool the limited partners
into believing that her ability is higher. Since an earlier IPO is a signal of better quality
of the inexperienced general partner, signaling incentives lead to earlier than optimal exit
timing of inexperienced general partners, consistent with the grandstanding phenomenon
of Gompers (1996).
The other two applications belong to the case of the decision maker beneting more
when outsiders believe that the projects NPV is lower than in reality, and thus imply an
ine¢ ciently delayed option exercise. Similar to the rst application, the third application
studies a delegated investment decision in a corporation. However, unlike the second appli-
cation, the nature of the agency conict is di¤erent. Specically, we consider a setting in
which a manager can divert a portion of the projects cash ows for private consumption,
which makes the problem a timing analogue of the literature on agency, asymmetric infor-
mation, and capital budgeting (e.g., Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv 1982; Stulz 1990; Bernardo,
Cai, and Luo 2001). In this application, private information gives the manager an incentive
to delay investment so that outside investors underestimate the true NPV of the project,
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which allows the manager to divert more without being caught. This creates incentives to
fool outside investors by investing as if the project was worse than in reality and thereby
leads to later investment than in the case of symmetric information. In equilibrium outside
investors correctly infer the NPV of the project, but still signal-jamming occurs: investment
is ine¢ ciently delayed to prevent the manager from fooling outside investors.
Finally, the fourth application we consider is sequential entry into a product market
in the duopoly framework outlined in Chapter 9 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The major
distinction of our application is that we relax the assumption that both rms observe the
potential NPV from launching the new product. Instead, we assume that the two rms are
asymmetrically informed: one rm knows the projects NPV, while the other learns it from
observing the investment (or lack of investment) of the better informed rm. As a result,
the better informed rm has an incentive to delay investment to signal that the quality of
the project is worse than in reality and thereby delay the entry of its competitor and enjoy
monopoly power for a longer period of time. Thus, the timing of investment is ine¢ ciently
delayed. However, the under-informed rm rationally anticipates the delay of investment
by the better informed rm, so in equilibrium the timing of investment reveals the NPV of
the product truthfully.
Our ndings have a number of implications. First, the e¤ect of information asymmetry
on investment timing is far from straightforward. In fact, information asymmetry can both
speed up and delay investment, thus leading to overinvestment and underinvestment, re-
spectively. The direction of distortion depends on the nature of the agency conict between
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the manager and shareholders. For example, both the rst and the third applications deal
with corporate investment under asymmetric information and agency, but have di¤erent
implications for the e¤ect of information asymmetry on investment. If the agency problem
is in managerial short-termism, then asymmetric information leads to earlier investment. In
contrast, if the agency problem is in the managers ability to divert cash ows for personal
consumption, then asymmetric information leads to later investment.
Second, because the degree of distortion depends on a simple and intuitive measure, one
can evaluate the qualitative e¤ect of asymmetric information on the timing of investment
even in complicated settings with multiple agency conicts of di¤ering natures. Clearly,
in the real world, there are many potential agency conicts, including managerial short-
termism and the ability to divert cash ows among others. One can obtain the resulting
e¤ect of asymmetric information by looking at the e¤ect on the managers payo¤ of a
marginal change in the belief of outsiders. This characterization can be important for
empirical research as it implies a clear-cut relation between investment, on the one hand,
and the complicated structure of managerial incentives, on the other hand.
Finally, regarding the last application, our ndings demonstrate that competitive ef-
fects on investment can be signicantly weakened if the competitors are asymmetrically
informed about the value of the investment opportunity. A substantial literature on real
options (e.g., Williams 1993; and Grenadier 2002) argues that the fear of being preempted
by a rival erodes the value of the option to wait and, as a consequence, speeds up invest-
ment. However, when the competitors are asymmetrically informed about the investment
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opportunity, better informed rms have incentives to fool the uninformed rms into under-
estimating the investment opportunity and delaying their investment. The better informed
rms achieve this by investing later than in the symmetric information case. Thus, signaling
incentives imply an additional value of waiting, and therefore greater delay in the rms
investment decisions.
Our paper combines the traditional literature on real options with the extensive litera-
ture on signaling. It is most closely related to real options models with imperfect informa-
tion. Grenadier (1999), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), and Hsu and Lambrecht (2007)
study option exercise games with information imperfections, however, with very di¤erent
equilibrium structures from that in this paper. In Grenadier (1999), each rm has an im-
perfect private signal about the true project value. In Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003)
each rm knows its own investment cost but not the investment cost of the competitor.
And in Hsu and Lambrecht (2003), an incumbent is uninformed about the challengers in-
vestment cost. While these papers study option exercise with information imperfections of
various forms, the belief of outsiders do not enter the payo¤ function of agents. Therefore,
the models in these papers are not examples of real options signaling games: the informed
decision maker has no incentives to manipulate investment timing so as to alter the belief
of outsiders.4
Notably, Morellec and Schürho¤ (2011) and Bustamante (2011) develop models that are
examples of real options signaling games, and thus can be thought of in the context of our
general model. Specically, in Morellec and Schürho¤ (2011), an informed rm, seeking
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external resources to nance an investment project, can choose both the timing of invest-
ment and the means of nancing (debt or equity) of the project. In Bustamante (2011),
an informed rm can decide on both the timing of investment and whether to nance its
investment project through an IPO or through more costly private capital. Bustamante
(2011) and Morellec and Schürho¤ (2011) nd that asymmetric information speeds up in-
vestment as the rm attempts to signal better quality and thereby secure cheaper nancing.
Our contribution relative to these papers is the characterization of the distortion of invest-
ment in a general setting of real options signaling games, which allows for a wide range
of environments where real options are common, such as public corporations, VC industry,
or entrepreneurial rms. First, we show that whether asymmetric information speeds up
or delays investment depends critically on the nature of the interactions between the deci-
sion maker and outsiders. In fact, as we show in the applications, signaling incentives can
often delay investment, unlike in Bustamante (2011) and Morellec and Schürho¤ (2011)
where signaling incentives always speed up investment because of the specic nature of the
interactions between the manager and outsiders. Second, we characterize the exact con-
ditions when each of the two distortions is in place. This implies specic predictions for
each particular institutional setting and shows when a distortion induced by one type of
agency conict (e.g., possibility of cash ow diversion) can be overturned by the presence
of another agency conict (e.g., managerial short-termism). Finally, Benmelech, Kandel,
and Veronesi (2010) consider a dynamic model of investment with asymmetric information
between the manager and outsiders and show that in the presence of stock-based compensa-
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tion, asymmetric information creates incentives to conceal bad news about growth options.
Unlike our paper, they focus on a specic setting and do not model investment as a real
option.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we formulate the
general model of option exercise in a signaling equilibrium and consider the special case
of symmetric information. In Section 2, we solve for the separating equilibrium of the
model, prove its existence and uniqueness, and determine when asymmetric information
leads to earlier or later option exercise. In Section 3, we consider two examples of real
options signaling games in which signaling incentives speed up option exercise: investment
in the presence of managerial myopia and VC grandstanding. In Section 4, we consider two
examples of real options signaling games in which signaling incentives delay option exercise:
investment under the opportunity to divert cash ows and strategic entry to the product
market. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
1 Model Setup
In this section we present a general model of a real options signaling game. Then, as a
useful benchmark, we provide the solution to the rst-best case of symmetric information.
For the ease of exposition, we discuss the model as if the real option is an option to invest.
However, this is without loss of generality. For example, the real option can also be an
option to penetrate a new market, make an acquisition, or sell a business.
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1.1 The real option
The rm possesses a real option of the standard form: at any time t, the rm can spend a
cost  > 0 to install an investment project. The project has a present value P (t), repre-
senting the discounted expected cash ows. Following the standard real options framework
(e.g., McDonald and Siegel 1986; Dixit and Pindyck 1994), we assume that P (t) evolves as
a geometric Brownian motion:
dP (t) = P (t) dt+ P (t) dB (t) ; (1)
where  > 0 and dB (t) is the increment of a standard Brownian motion. All agents in the
economy are risk-neutral, with the risk-free rate of interest denoted by r. To ensure nite
values, we assume  < r.5 If the rm invests at time t, it gets the value of:
P (t)   + "; (2)
where " is a zero-mean noise term, reecting the di¤erence between the realized value of
the project and its expected value upon investment. It reects uncertainty over the value
of the project at the time of investment, which can stem from random realized cash ows
or random installation costs.
The investment decision is made by the agent, who has superior information about the
NPV of the project. Specically, P (t) is publicly observable and known to both the agent
and outsiders. In contrast,  is the private information of the agent, which we refer to as
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the agents (or projects) type. Because the payo¤ of the project depends on  negatively,
higher types correspond to worse projects. Outsiders do not have any information about 
except for its ex-ante distribution, which is given by the cumulative distribution function
 () with positive density function  () dened on ; , where  >  > 0.6
Thus, the payo¤ from investment is comprised of three components: the publicly ob-
servable component P (t), the privately observable component , and the noise term ".
Outsiders will update their belief about the type of the agent by observing the timing of in-
vestment and its proceeds. The noise term " ensures that proceeds from investment provide
only an imperfect signal of the agents private information.7
1.2 The agents utility from exercise
Having characterized the project payo¤, we move on to the utility that the agent receives
from exercise. We assume that the agents utility from exercise is the sum of two com-
ponents. The rst component is the direct e¤ect of the proceeds from the project on the
agents compensation. This e¤ect can be explicit, such as through the agents stock owner-
ship in the rm, or implicit, such as through future changes in the agents compensation.
For tractability reasons, we abstain from solving the optimal contracting problem, and in-
stead simply assume that the agent receives a positive share  of the total payo¤ from
the investment project.8 The second component is the indirect e¤ect of investment on the
agents utility due to its e¤ect on outsidersbelief about the agents type. Intuitively, the
timing of investment can reveal information about the agent, such as an ability to generate
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protable investment projects. Letting ~ denote outsidersinference about the type of the
agent after the investment, the agents utility from the option exercise is:
Agents utility from exercise = share of project + belief component (3)
=  (P ()   + ") +W

~; 

:
While standard real options models typically assume that the agents utility is solely a
function of the option payo¤, in this case the agent also cares about the belief of outsiders,
in that ~ explicitly enters into the agents payo¤ function. The form of the utility function
is general enough to accommodate a variety of settings in which a real option is exercised
by a better informed party who cares about the belief of less informed outsiders.9
Following Mailath (1987), we impose the following regularity conditions on W

~; 

:
Assumption 1. W

~; 

is C2 on

; 
2
;
Assumption 2. W (; ) < ;
Assumption 3. W~

~; 

never equals zero on

; 
2
, and so is either positive or
negative;
Assumption 4. W

~; 

is such that W

~; 

<  8

~; 

2 ; 2 and W~ (; ) +
W (; ) <  8 2

; 

;
Assumption 5. Agents utility from exercise satises the single-crossing condition,
dened in Appendix A.
16
These conditions allow us to establish the existence and uniqueness of the separating
equilibrium derived in the following section. Assumption 1 is a standard smoothness restric-
tion. Assumption 2 states that under perfect information the e¤ect of the belief component
does not exceed the direct e¤ect of . This ensures that the exercise decision is non-trivial,
because otherwise the optimal exercise decision would be to invest immediately for any
projects present value P (t). Assumption 3 is the belief monotonicity condition, which
requires the agents payo¤ to be monotone in outsidersbelief about the agents type. This
denes two cases to be analyzed. IfW~ < 0, then the agent benets if outsiders believe that
the project has a lower investment cost. Conversely, if W~ > 0, then the agent gains from
belief of outsiders that the project has a higher investment cost. Assumption 4 means that
the agent is better o¤ from having a better project: W

~; 

<  implies that the agents
utility from exercise is decreasing in  for any xed level of the outsidersbelief; similarly,
W~ (; ) +W (; ) <  implies that the agents utility from exercise is decreasing in  if
both the agent and outsiders know . Finally, Assumption 5 ensures that if the agent does
not make extra gains by misrepresenting  slightly, then she cannot make extra gains from
a large misrepresentation. It allows us to nd the separating equilibrium by considering
only the rst-order condition.
1.3 Symmetric information benchmark
As a benchmark, we consider the case in which information is symmetric. Specically,
assume that both the agent and outsiders observe .10 Let V  (P; ) denote the value of
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the investment option to the agent, if the type of the agent is  and the current level of
P (t) is P . Using standard arguments (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994), in the range prior to
investment, V  (P; ) must solve the di¤erential equation:
0 =
1
2
2P 2V PP + PV

P   rV : (4)
Suppose that the agent of type  invests the rst time when P (t) crosses threshold
P  () from below. Upon investment, the payo¤ of the agent is specied in (3), implying
the boundary condition for the agents expected payo¤ from exercise:
V  (P  () ; ) =  (P  ()  ) +W (; ) : (5)
Solving (4) subject to boundary condition (5) yields the following option value to the
agent:11
V  (P; ) =
8>><>>:

P
P ()

( (P  ()  ) +W (; )) ; if P  P  () ;
 (P   ) +W (; ) ; if P > P  () ;
(6)
where  is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic equation 1
2
2 (   1)+ r = 0:
 =
1
2
24   2
2

+
s
  
2
2
2
+ 2r2
35 > 1: (7)
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The investment trigger P  () is chosen by the agent so as to maximize her value:
P  () = arg max
P^2R+

1
P^ 



P^   

+W (; )

: (8)
Taking the rst-order condition, we conclude that P  () is given by:
P  () =

   1

   W (; )


: (9)
In particular, if W (; ) = 0, we get the standard solution (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994):
P  () = = (   1). Because the agents utility from exercise is decreasing in  by As-
sumption 4, the investment threshold P  () is increasing in , which means that the rm
invests earlier if the project is better.
The results of the benchmark case can be summarized in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Suppose that  is known both to the agent and to outsiders. Then, the
investment threshold of type , P  (), is given by (9) and is increasing in .
2 Analysis
In this section we provide the solution to the general real options signaling game under
asymmetric information between the agent and outsiders. First, we solve for the agents
optimal exercise strategy for a given inference function of outsiders. Then, we apply the
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rational expectations condition that the inference function must be consistent with the
agents exercise strategy. This gives us the equilibrium investment threshold. We present
a heuristic analysis in this section and prove that it indeed yields the unique separating
equilibrium in Proposition 2. Finally, we analyze properties of the equilibrium.
2.1 Optimal exercise
To solve for the separating equilibrium, consider the agents optimal exercise strategy for
a given outsidersinference function. Specically, suppose that outsiders believe that the
agent of type  exercises the option at trigger P (), where P () is a monotonic and dif-
ferentiable function of . Thus, if the agent exercises the option at trigger P^ 2 P  ; ,
then upon exercise outsiders infer that the agents type is P 1

P^

.12
Let V

P; ~; 

denote the value of the option to the agent, where P is the current value
of P (t), ~ is a xed outsidersbelief about the agents type, and  is the agents true type.
By the standard valuation arguments (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994), in the region prior to
exercise, V (P; ~; ) must satisfy the di¤erential equation:
0 =
1
2
2P 2VPP + PVP   rV: (10)
Suppose that the agent decides to invest at trigger P^ . Upon investment, the payo¤ to
the agent is equal to (3), implying the boundary condition:
V (P^ ; ~; ) = 

P^   

+W (~; ): (11)
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Solving di¤erential equation (10) subject to boundary condition (11) yields the value of
the option to the agent for a given investment threshold and the belief of outsiders:13
V (P; ~; ; P^ ) = P U

~; ; P^

; (12)
where:
U

~; ; P^

=
1
P^ 
h


P^   

+W (~; )
i
: (13)
Given solution (12) and the hypothesized outsidersinference function P , the optimal
choice of exercise threshold P^ 2 P  ;  solves:
P^
 
; P
 2 arg max
Y 2 P([;])

1
Y 
 
 (Y   ) +W   P 1 (Y ) ;  : (14)
Taking the rst-order condition, we arrive at the optimality condition:




P^   

+W

P 1

P^

; 

= P^ + P^W~

P 1

P^

; 

d P 1(P^)
dP^
: (15)
Equation (15) illustrates the fundamental trade-o¤between the costs and benets of waiting
in the model with asymmetric information between the agent and outsiders. On the one
hand, a higher threshold leads to a longer waiting period and, hence, greater discounting
of cash ows from the option exercise. This e¤ect is captured by the expression on the
left-hand side of (15). On the other hand, a higher threshold leads to a greater NPV at the
exercise time and higher belief of outsiders. These e¤ects are captured by the rst and the
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second terms on the right-hand side of (15), respectively.
2.2 Equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium under rational expectations, the inference function P () must
be a monotonic function that is perfectly revealing. Thus, P 1(P^ ) = . Intuitively, this
means that when the agent takes the inference function P () as given, her exercise behavior
fully reveals the true type.
Conjecturing that a separating equilibrium exists, we can set P 1(P^ ) =  in equation
(15) and simplify to derive the equilibrium di¤erential equation:
d P ()
d
=
W~ (; )
P ()

 
(   1) P ()  + W (; ) : (16)
The equilibrium di¤erential equation (16) is solved subject to the appropriate initial
value condition. By Assumption 3, there are two cases to consider.
Case 1: W~ < 0
For this case, the appropriate initial value condition is that the highest type invests
e¢ ciently:
P
 


= P 
 


: (17)
The intuition is as follows. Suppose you are the worst possible type, which is  for the case
W~ < 0. Then any exercise strategy in which (17) did not hold would not be incentive-
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compatible. This is because type  could always deviate and choose the full-information
trigger P (). Not only would this deviation improve the direct payo¤ from exercise, but
the agent could do no worse in terms of reputation since the current belief is already as
bad as possible.14 Therefore, only when (17) holds does the worst possible type have no
incentive to deviate.
Case 2: W~ > 0
For this case, the appropriate initial value condition is that the lowest type invests
e¢ ciently:
P () = P  () : (18)
The intuition for (18) is the same as for (17). However, with W~ > 0,  is now the worst
type.
Proposition 2 shows that under regularity conditions, there exists a unique (up to the
out-of-equilibrium beliefs) separating equilibrium, and it is given as a solution to equation
(16) subject to boundary condition (17) or (18). The proof appears in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 Let P () be the increasing function that solves di¤erential equation (16),
subject to the initial value condition (17) if W~ < 0, or (18) if W~ > 0, where Assumptions
1-5 are satised. Then, P () is the investment trigger of type  in the unique (up to the
out-of-equilibrium beliefs) separating equilibrium.
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2.3 Properties of the equilibrium
To examine how asymmetric information a¤ects the equilibrium timing of investment, we
compare the separating equilibrium derived above with the symmetric information solution
established in Section 1.3.
Proposition 3 shows that asymmetric information between the decision maker and out-
siders has an important e¤ect on the timing of investment. Its direction depends on the
sign of W~. The proof appears in Appendix B.
Proposition 3 Asymmetric information between the decision maker and outsiders a¤ects
the timing of investment. The direction of the e¤ect depends on the sign of W~:
(i) If W~ < 0, then the rm invests earlier than in the case of symmetric information:
P () < P  () for all  < :
(ii) If W~ > 0, then the rm invests later than in the case of symmetric information:
P () > P  () for all  > :
As we can see, information asymmetry has powerful consequences for the timing of
investment. It can both increase and decrease the waiting period, and the direction of the
e¤ect depends on the sign of W~. The intuition comes from traditional signal-jamming
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models (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1986; Stein 1989; and Holmstrom 1999). When  is
the agents private information, outsiders try to infer it from observing when the rm
invests. Knowing this, the agent has incentives to manipulate the timing of investment
to confuse outsiders. For example, if W~ > 0, the agent has an interest in mimicking the
investment strategy of the agent with a higher investment cost. Since higher types invest
at higher investment thresholds, the agent will try to mimic that by investing later than in
the case of symmetric information. In equilibrium, outsiders correctly infer the type of the
agent from observing the timing of investment. However, signal-jamming occurs: outsiders
correctly conjecture that investment occurs at a higher threshold. The opposite happens
when W~ < 0.
For concreteness, let us consider a particular parameterization ofW

~; 

that permits a
simple analytical solution. Specically, we setW

~; 

= w

~   

, for some functionw ()
with w(0) being normalized to zero.15 In this case, the agents utility from misspecication
of outsidersbelief about the agents private information depends only on the degree of
misspecication, ~   . For this special case, equation (16) takes the following form:
d P ()
d
=
P ()w0 (0)

 
(   1) P ()   : (19)
The general solution to this equation is given implicitly by:
P () + C P ()
  
w0(0) =
 + w0(0)=
   1 ; (20)
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where the constant C is determined by the appropriate boundary condition.
For the case in which w0 < 0, we apply boundary condition (17) to show that the
equilibrium solution P () satises:
P ()
0@1 + w0(0)

 
P ()
P 
 

!  w0(0) 1
1A =  + w0(0)=
   1 : (21)
In the limit, if the highest type has an unboundedly large cost ( ! 1), then P ()
approaches the simple linear solution:16
P ()   + w
0(0)=
   1 : (22)
For the case in which w0 > 0, we apply boundary condition (18) to show that the
equilibrium solution P () satises:
P ()
 
1 +
w0(0)

 P ()
P  ()
  
w0(0) 1
!
=
 + w0(0)=
   1 : (23)
If the lowest type can reach an innitesimal cost ( ! 0), then P () again approaches the
simple linear solution (22).
2.4 Other equilibria
While our paper focuses on the separating equilibrium, various forms of pooling equilibria
are also possible. Here, we present a simple example of an equilibrium in which there is a
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range of types that pool, and a range of types that separate. Notably, the construction of
this equilibrium with pooling requires much of the analysis presented for the construction
of the separating equilibrium.
In this simple example,  is distributed uniformly over

; 

. We also assume a simple
functional form for the belief component: cw

~   

, with cw < 0, where ~ now refers to
the expected type of the agent according to the belief of outsiders.17 Finally, in this simple
example, we assume that proceeds from the project are not informative about the agents
type. Consider type ^ 2  ; . We will show that there exists a Ppool, with Ppool  P ^ <
P 

^

, such that all types  in the range
h
; ^
i
pool and exercise together at Ppool, while
all types  in the range (^; ] separate and exercise at the trigger P ().
Suppose that P (t) = Ppool and consider the decision of the agent whether to exercise the
option immediately and pool or wait and exercise the option in the future. For types that
exercise immediately and pool, ~ =

 + ^

=2. Thus, the immediate payo¤ from pooling
is:
 (Ppool   ) + cw
 
 + ^
2
  
!
: (24)
Types that wait and separate obtain:

Ppool
P ()


 
P ()   ; (25)
where P () is the threshold of type  in the fully separating equilibrium, given by (16) -
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(17).18 Type ^ is the one that is indi¤erent between pooling and separating:


Ppool   ^

+ cw
 
   ^
2
!
=
 
Ppool
P (^)
!


P (^)  ^

: (26)
As shown in Appendix B, for any ^, (26) determines the unique value of Ppool

^

. All types
 < ^ nd it optimal to exercise at Ppool

^

, while all types  > ^ nd it optimal to separate
and exercise at P (). By varying ^, one can obtain a continuum of these equilibria. In
addition, there may exist equilibria with higher types pooling and lower types separating,
as well as equilibria with multiple pooling groups. In general, it is di¢ cult to say whether
the agents utility in the separating equilibrium is higher or lower than in other equilibria.
As shown in Appendix B, in this particular example the agents utility in the semi-pooling
equilibrium is the same as in the separating equilibria if   ^ and higher than the utility
in the separating equilibrium if  < ^.
Given multiplicity of equilibria, it is important to select the most reasonable one. A
standard approach in signaling games to select between equilibria is to impose additional
restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. One standard restriction is the D1 renement,
which has been applied to a wide range of signaling environments such as security design
(e.g., Nachman and Noe 1994; DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz 2005) and intercorporate
asset sales (Hege et al. 2009). Intuitively, according to the D1 renement, following an
unexpectedaction of the informed party, the uninformed party is restricted to place zero
posterior belief on type  whenever there is another type 0 that has a stronger incentive to
deviate.19 As Cho and Sobel (1990) and Ramey (1996) show, only separating equilibria can
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satisfy the D1 renement. A slight modication of Rameys (1996) proof can be applied here
to establish the same result in our model.20 Thus, the separating equilibrium is in fact the
unique equilibrium under the assumption that out-of-equilibrium beliefs must satisfy the
restriction specied by the D1 renement. In this regard, focusing on separating equilibria
is without loss of generality.
3 Applications with Acceleration of Option Exercise
3.1 Managerial myopia
In this section we present an application of the timing signaling equilibrium that is similar
in spirit to Steins (1989) article on managerial myopia. In Stein (1989), the manager
cares about both the current stock price and long-run earnings. The manager invests
ine¢ ciently through earnings manipulation (by boosting current earnings at the expense of
future earnings) to attempt to fool the stock market into overestimating future earnings in
the stock valuation. Even though the equilibrium ensures that the market is not fooled, the
manager behaves myopically and ine¢ ciently sacrice future earnings for short-term prots.
Our version is an analog of Stein (1989) that focuses on investment timing, rather than
earnings manipulation. Here, the manager invests ine¢ ciently by exercising the investment
option too early to attempt to fool the market into overestimating the projects NPV.
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3.1.1 Manager utility
As in Stein (1989), the managers utility comes from a combination of current stock value
and long-run earnings value. Specically, the managers utility comes from holding 1 > 0
shares of stock that may be freely sold, plus 2 > 0 times the present value of future
earnings. This can be viewed as a reduced form utility coming out of a more complicated
model of incentive compensation.21 Thus, the manager makes two decisions: when to invest
in the project and when to sell holdings that may be freely sold.22
Let S(t) denote the stock price and P (t) the present value of the projects cash ows. At
a chosen time of exercise  , if the manager still holds 1 shares of stock, her stock holdings
will be worth 1S().23 Similarly, her utility from her interest in the present value of all
future earnings is 2 (P ()  ). In summary, the managers utility from exercise at any
time  is:
managers utility from exercise = 1S() + 2 (P ()  ) : (27)
3.1.2 The stock price process
Let us now consider the valuation of the stock. The market will infer the value of  by
observing whether or not the manager has yet invested. We begin by valuing the stock for
all moments prior to the investment in the project. During this time period, the market
updates its belief every time the project value rises to a new historical maximum. Let P ()
denote the equilibrium investment threshold for type , a function increasing in  to be
determined below. Let PM (t) denote the historical maximum of P (t) up to time t. Then,
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at any time t prior to investment, the stock price S(t) = S (P (t) ; PM (t)) is given by:
S (P (t) ; PM (t)) = E
"
P (t)
P ()
  
P ()   j > P 1 (PM (t))# : (28)
Next, consider the value of the stock when the rm invests at threshold P^ . At this
moment, the market observes the investment trigger, and the stock price immediately is
set using the imputed ~ = P 1

P^

. Thus, the stock price immediately jumps to the value
P^   P 1

P^

. Finally, after the net proceeds from investment are realized, the stock price
moves to P^   + ". Recall, however, that the market is unable to disentangle the true cost
from    ", and its expectation of  remains ~.
3.1.3 The equilibrium investment decision
Consider the managers investment timing decision, conditional on holding 1 shares of
tradable stock. Suppose that the manager has not sold the tradable shares prior to the
investment date. If the markets belief about the type of the manager, ~, is below , the
manager is better o¤ selling shares immediately upon the investment date and gaining from
the markets optimistic belief: she receives P^   ~ from selling versus (an expected) P^   
from holding. Alternatively, if ~  , the manager is better o¤ holding the stock. Thus,
given the equilibrium threshold function P (), the problem of the manager who does not
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sell the stock before the investment date is:
max
P^

1~<

1
1
P^ 

P^   ~

+ 2
1
P^ 

P^   

+ 1~ (1 + 2)
1
P^ 

P^   

(29)
= max
P^

(1 + 2)
1
P^ 

P^   

  1
P^ 
1min

~   ; 0

:
We can thus see that this problem is a special case of the general model with:
W

~; 

=  1min

~   ; 0

and  = 1 + 2. (30)
Moreover, becauseW

~; 

is a function of ~ , the separating equilibrium function P ()
is given by (20):24
P () + C P ()
(1+2)
1 =
   1
1+2
   1 : (31)
The boundary condition for equation (31) is determined by noting that the manager
may choose to sell shares prior to investment. In the separating equilibrium with all 1
shares held, information is fully revealed, and thus the manager does not gain from selling
overvalued stock at the time of investment. Therefore, the manager sells shares before
investment if and only if they are overvalued by the market. As is apparent from the
valuation function in (28), the overvaluation is decreasing over time, and thus the manager
will either sell shares at the initial point, or never. Thus, the appropriate boundary condition
is that for the range of  for which the stock is initially overvalued, the manager will choose
to sell all of liquid shares. This implies that for this range of , 1 = 0 in equation (31),
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which means that P () equals the rst-best trigger: P () = 
 1.
All that remains is to determine the range of  at which immediate sale of stock is war-
ranted. If the stock is sold immediately, the stock will be priced based on the markets prior
on , or
R 


P (0)
P ()
  
P ()   () d.25 If the stock is held, it is worth P (0)P ()   P ()  .
Therefore, the manager will sell stock immediately if and only if  is above a xed threshold
^, determined by: Z 

P ()  
P ()
 () d =
P

^

  ^
P

^
 : (32)
We have now fully characterized the solution. For  2
h
; ^
i
, the investment threshold
P () is given by (31), where C is given by:
C =  


   1 ^
 (1+2)
1 1
(1 + 2) (   1) ^: (33)
For  2 (^; ], P () = 
 1.
3.1.4 Discussion
The equilibrium investment strategy is to invest according to strategy P () in (31), which
implies earlier investment than in the case of symmetric information for all types below ^.
For types above ^, however, investment occurs at the fullinformation threshold. Intuitively,
if the private information of the manager is such that the stock is overvalued, then the
manager sells the exible part of her holdings before investment reveals the type of the
project. Once the manager sells her tradable stock, the manager no longer has any short-
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term incentives, so she chooses the investment threshold to maximize the long-term rm
value. On the contrary, if the project is su¢ ciently good, then the stock of the company
is undervalued relative to the private information of the manager, so she does not sell the
exible part of her holdings. As a result, when deciding on the optimal time to invest, the
manager cares not only about the long-term rm value but also about the short-term stock
price. In an attempt to manipulate the stock price, the manager invests earlier than in
the symmetric information case. In equilibrium, the market correctly predicts this myopic
behavior and infers the private information correctly.
The left graph of Figure 1 shows the equilibrium investment threshold P () as a func-
tion of the investment cost  for three di¤erent values of 1= (1 + 2). The equilibrium
investment threshold P () has two interesting properties. First, it moves further away
from the rst-best investment threshold P  () as 1= (1 + 2) goes up. Intuitively, if
the manager can freely sell a higher portion of her shares, she has a greater incentive to
invest earlier to fool the market into overestimating the NPV of the project and thereby
boost the current stock price. Even though the market correctly infers  in equilibrium,
the equilibrium investment threshold goes down so that the manager has no incentives to
deviate. Second, for each of the curves, the impact of asymmetric information is lower for
projects with greater costs (lower types). Intuitively, incentive compatibility requires that
the investment threshold of type  be su¢ ciently below that of type +" for an innitesimal
positive ", so that type  + " has no incentives to mimic type . However, this lowers not
only the investment threshold of type , but also investment thresholds of all types below
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, as they must have no incentives to mimic . In this way, the distortion accumulates, so
the investment threshold of a lower type is closer to the zero NPV rule.
Another implication is that the investment option value can be signicantly eroded
through information asymmetry.26 Analogously to Grenadier (2002), let the option pre-
mium dene the NPV of investment at the moment of exercise divided by the investment
cost:
OP

;
1
1 + 2

=
P ()  

: (34)
The right graph of Figure 1 quanties the e¤ect of asymmetric information on the option
premium. In the case of symmetric information, equilibrium investment occurs only when
the NPV of the project is more than 2:41 times its investment cost. Asymmetric information
reduces the option premium, and the e¤ect is greater for projects with lower investment
costs and managers with greater incentives to boost the short-run stock price. For example,
if the manager can freely sell 50% of her shares, the option premium of type  = 1 is 1:41, a
greater than 40% decrease from the symmetric information case. Asymmetric information
typically a¤ects the option premium of the best projects the most and does not a¤ect the
option premium of su¢ ciently bad projects at all.
3.2 Venture capital grandstanding
In this section we consider an application of our real options signaling model to VC rms.
As shown in Gompers (1996), younger VC rms often take companies public earlier to
establish a reputation and successfully raise capital for new funds. Gompers terms this
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phenomenon grandstandingand suggests that younger VC rms employ early timing of
IPOs as a signal of their ability to form higher-quality portfolios.
We characterize experienced VC rms (the general partners) as those having a perfor-
mance track record, and inexperienced VC rms as having no performance track record.
For simplicity, we consider a two-stage model. An inexperienced VC rm invests outsiders
(limited partners) money in the rst round. The rm then chooses when to allow its rst
round portfolio companies to go public. When such an IPO takes place, the rm becomes
experienced and raises money for the second round. Notably, its ability to attract outsiders
funds in the second round will depend on the belief of outsiders of its skill, as inferred from
the results of the rst round.
We shall work backwards and initially consider the second round (an experienced VC
rm), to be followed by the rst round (an inexperienced VC rm).
3.2.1 The experienced VC rm
In the second round of nancing, I2 dollars are invested, where I2 is endogenized below.
The value of the fund, should it choose to go public at time t, is:
(P2(t)   + "2)H(I2); (35)
where P2 (t) is the publicly observable component of value,  is the privately observed value
of the VC rms skill, and "2 is a zero-mean shock, which corresponds to the contribution of
luck. Only the VC rm knows the value of its skill  (lower  means higher skill); the outside
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investors must use an inferred value of ~.27 While outside investors cannot disentangle the
mix of skill and luck, the VC rm learns the realization of luck, "2, upon investment. Finally,
H(:) describes the nature of the returns to scale on investment. To account for declining
returns to scale (that is, at some point the rm runs out of good project opportunities), we
impose the Inada conditions: H(0) = 0, H 0 > 0, H 00 < 0, H 0 (0) =1, and H 0 (1) = 0. In
addition, we assume that H 000 is continuous.
We assume that the VC rm receives as compensation a fraction  of the proceeds from
an IPO (or a similar liquidity event).28 The VC rm decides if and when to allow the
portfolio to go public. Thus, the timing of the IPO is a standard option exercise problem
where the expected payo¤ to the VC rm upon exercise is:
 (P2 (t)  )H(I2): (36)
The optimal second round IPO exercise trigger is thus the rst-best solution:
P2 () =

   1: (37)
We now endogenize the second round level of investment. At the beginning of the
second round, the limited partners decide how much capital to contribute to the fund. We
normalize the value of the publicly observable component upon the initiation of the second
round, P2 (0), to one, so that P2(t) represents the value growth over the initial cost.29 The
limited partners choose the level of investment I2 so as to maximize the expected value of
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their net investment. Because the limited partners do not observe the VC rms skill ,
they use inference ~ based on the IPO signal from the rst round. For a given ~, the limited
partners choose I2 by solving the following optimization problem:
max
I2
8><>:(1  )
P2

~

  ~
P2

~
 H (I2)  I2
9>=>; : (38)
The Inada conditions guarantee that the optimal level of investment, I2

~

, is given by
the rst-order condition:
I2

~

= H 0
 1
"

   1

   1
1  
~
 1
#
: (39)
I2

~

is strictly decreasing in ~, meaning that the limited partners invest more if they
believe that the general partner is more skilled.
Thus, for given ~ and , the value of the second round nancing to the VC rm is:

P2 ()  
P2 ()

H

I2

~

: (40)
Importantly, this value is a decreasing function of the inferred type ~. Hence, the VC rm
benets from higher inferred skill.
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3.2.2 The inexperienced VC rm
Now, let us consider the rst round.30 The fund has I1 invested, and the VC rm must
choose if and when to allow its portfolio to go public. The payo¤ to the VC rm is the sum
of their share of the proceeds from going public and the expected utility of the second round
nancing. The proceeds from going public at time t are (P1 (t)   + "1)H (I1), where "1
is a zero-mean shock, while the value of the second round nancing is given by (40). Thus,
for an IPO trigger of P^1, the expected payo¤ to the VC rm is:


P^1   

H(I1) + 
P2 ()  
P2 ()

H

I2

~

; (41)
where I2

~

is given by (39). For simplicity, we normalize H (I1) to 1. We can thus see
that this problem corresponds to the general model with:31
W

~; 

= 
P2 ()  
P2 ()

H

I2

~

; (42)
where W~ < 0. Assuming that the lowest possible type is not too low:
 >
   1

 
   W
 
; 


!
; (43)
39
the single-crossing condition is satised.32 Thus, the separating equilibrium the investment
trigger P1 () is given by:
d P1 ()
d
=
P1 () I
0
2 () = (1  )
(   1) P1 ()   +  P2() P2() H (I2 ())
; (44)
solved subject to the boundary condition that type  invests at the full-information thresh-
old:33
P1
 


=

   1
 
  
P2
 

  
P2
 

 H  I2  
!
: (45)
3.2.3 Discussion
The timing of the IPO of the inexperienced rm characterized by (44)-(45) has several
intuitive properties. First, the inexperienced rm takes the portfolio public earlier than
optimal. Because the inexperienced rm is better informed about its talent than the limited
partners, the inexperienced rm has an incentive to manipulate the timing of the IPO to
make the limited partners believe that its quality is higher. Because an earlier IPO is a
signal of higher quality, it will go public earlier than in the case of symmetric information.
In equilibrium signal-jamming occurs: the limited partners correctly conjecture that the VC
rm goes public earlier than optimal, so the type of the general partner is revealed. The
degree of ine¢ cient timing is illustrated in Figure 2. The left graph plots the equilibrium
exercise threshold of the inexperienced rm, P1 (), and the e¢ cient exercise threshold,
P 1 (), which would be the equilibrium if the limited partners were fully informed about
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the general partners talent.
Ine¢ cient investment timing depends not only on the experience of the general partner,
but also on the rms talent. Specically, (45) implies that the least talented rm takes the
portfolio public at the e¢ cient time even if it is inexperienced. At the same time, all other
types take the portfolio public earlier than e¢ cient. The right graph of Figure 2 illustrates
the dependence of earlier than optimal IPO on the general partners talent. The degree of
ine¢ cient investment increases in the general partners talent from 0% for the least talented
general partner ( = 2) to 19% for the most talented general partner ( = 1).
While the inexperienced rm takes the company public earlier than optimal, the expe-
rienced rm does so at the e¢ cient threshold. Because the limited partners learn the true
talent of the rm from observing its track record, the experienced rm does not have any
incentive to manipulate the belief of the limited partners.
4 Applications with Delay of Option Exercise
4.1 Cash ow diversion
We consider a cash ow diversion model where a manager (with a partial ownership in-
terest) derives utility from diverting the owners cash ow from investment for personal
consumption.34 Thus, in this case the manager would like shareholders to believe that the
investment cost is higher than in reality. We begin by providing a costly state verication
model to endogenize the managers cash ow diversion utility. Then, conditional on the
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managers diversion incentives, we move on to modeling the managers optimal investment
strategy.
The assumption that a portion of project value is observed only by the manager and not
veriable by the owners is common in the capital budgeting literature. This information
asymmetry invites a host of agency issues. Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) posit that
managers have incentives to understate project payo¤s and to divert the free cash ow to
themselves. In their model, such value diversion takes the form of the manager reducing
her level of e¤ort. Stulz (1990), Harris and Raviv (1996), Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001),
and Malenko (2011) model the manager as having preferences for perquisite consumption
or empirebuilding. In these models, the manager has incentives to divert free cash ows
to ine¢ cient investments or to excessive perquisites. Grenadier and Wang (2005) apply an
optimal contracting approach to ensure against diversion and to provide an incentive for
the manager to exercise optimally.
4.1.1 Costly state verication model
Suppose that the manager can divert any amount d from the project value before the noise
" is realized.35 As is standard in the literature (e.g., DeMarzo and Sannikov 2006), diversion
is potentially wasteful, so that the manager receives only a fraction  2 [0; 1] of the diverted
value. After the project cash ow of P     d+ " is realized, the shareholders either verify
whether the manager diverted or not. Verication costs c > 0. If the shareholders verify
that the manager diverted funds d from the rm, the manager is required to return them to
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the rm.36 Thus, the timing of the interactions is the following. First, the manager decides
when to exercise the investment option. Then, after the investment has been made but
before the cash ow is realized, the shareholders decide on the verication strategy.37 As
in traditional costly state verication models (Townsend 1979; Gale and Hellwig 1985), the
investors (shareholders in our case) can commit to the deterministic verication strategy.
After that but before observing the noise ", the manager decides how much to divert.
Finally, the projects cash ow of P      d + " is realized, and the shareholders either
verify the manager or not, according to the pre-specied verication strategy. Let 	 and  
denote the cumulative distribution and density functions of ", respectively. Assume that  
is C2.
In Appendix B, we demonstrate that any optimal verication strategy takes the form
of verifying the manager if and only if the di¤erence between the expected and the realized
cash ows is greater than a particular threshold. In other words, for some v, verication
occurs if and only if P      d + "  

P   ~

< v, or, equivalently, " < v   ~ +  + d.
Let us initially choose any verication parameter v and determine the managers optimal
diversion strategy in response. Then, conditional on this managerial response, we determine
the shareholdersoptimal choice of v.
Consider a manager of type  that is inferred by the market as type ~. If the manager
diverts d, she expects to be veried with probability 	

v   ~ +  + d

, in which case there
is no impact on her payo¤, as the diverted cash ow is returned to the rm. However, she
is not veried with probability 1   	

v   ~ +  + d

, in which case she gains fraction 
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of the diverted cash ow for her private benet and loses fraction  due to her ownership
position. Hence, the managers problem is:
max
d0
n
(  ) d

1 	

v   ~ +  + d
o
: (46)
Clearly, if   , then the manager does not divert anything: d = 0.38 Now, con-
sider the case  < . Assuming that the hazard rate of the distribution of ", h (z) 
 (z) = (1 	(z)), is increasing, (46) has a unique solution d that satises:
dh 

v   ~ +  + d

= 1: (47)
The solution d is a decreasing function of v ~+. Let us denote this functional dependence
by D

v   ~ + 

.
Given the managers response to verication rule v, we now solve for the shareholders
optimal choice of v. Under the shareholdersinformation set, they expect the manager to
divert D (v) and estimate the probability of verication at 	(v +D (v)). For any choice of
v, the shareholders lose 1    of the diverted cash ow when verication does not occur,
and pay cost c when verication occurs. Thus, the optimal verication parameter v is:
v = argmin
v
f(1  ) (1 	(v +D (v)))D (v) + 	 (v +D (v)) cg : (48)
In summary, we have determined the managers diversion and shareholdersverication
strategies. If   , then the manager does not divert cash ow and the shareholders do
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not verify the manager: d = 0; v =  1. If  < , the manager diverts D

v   ~ + 

,
and the shareholders verify the manager if and only if the projects realized cash ow falls
below v + P   ~.
4.1.2 Equilibrium investment timing
Given the managers diversion rule derived above, her payo¤ from exercising the option at
threshold P^ , when her type is  and the shareholdersbelief is ~, equals:


P^   

+max (  ; 0)D

v   ~ + 

1 	

v   ~ +  +D

v   ~ + 

: (49)
Thus, this problem is a special case of the general model with:
W

~; 

= max (  ; 0)D

v   ~ + 

1 	

v   ~ +  +D

v   ~ + 

: (50)
Notice that for  > , W~

~; 

> 0, meaning that the application corresponds to Case 2
of the general model. Intuitively, as the shareholders become more pessimistic about the
projects value, the manager diverts more and gets veried less frequently.
Using the solution analogous to (23), we can express P () implicitly as the solution to
the following equation:39
1 +
max (  ; 0) (1 	(v +D (v)))

 P ()
P  ()
  
max( ;0)(1 	(v+D(v))) 1
(51)
=
 +max
 


  1; 0 (1 	(v +D (v)))
   1
  max  

  1; 0D (v) (1 	(v +D (v)))
P ()
;
45
where P  () is the symmetric-information threshold of type :
P  () =

   1

  max



  1; 0

D (v) (1 	(v +D (v)))

: (52)
Note that for the case of   , P () = P  () = 
 1.
4.1.3 Discussion
The e¤ect of potential cash ow diversion on the timing of investment is illustrated in
Figure 3. If diversion is su¢ ciently costly (  ), or, equivalently, managerial ownership
is su¢ ciently high, then the interests of the manager and those of the outside shareholders
are aligned. Because diversion is never optimal in this case, information asymmetry does not
a¤ect the investment strategy. If diversion is not costly enough ( > ), then information
asymmetry leads to a delay in investment compared to the case of symmetric information.
Interestingly, diversion also a¤ects investment threshold under symmetric information about
. When the manager expects to divert value from the project, she exercises the option at a
lower threshold. Because the manager diverts the same amount for any exercise threshold,
higher diversion is equivalent to a decrease in the investment cost from the managers point
of view. Consequently, the symmetric information threshold for the case  = 0:5 is lower
than that for the case  = 0.
In Figure 3, distortion in the investment threshold due to information asymmetry is
greater for projects of lower quality. This result contrasts with the results in the previous
two applications. There the exercise trigger is altered in a way that the manager has no
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incentives to mimic a lower type. As a result, distortion in the exercise timing does not
exist for the highest types (worst projects) and exists for lower types. In contrast, now the
exercise trigger is altered in a way that the manager has no incentives to mimic a higher
type. As a result, distortion in exercise timing does not exist for the lowest types (best
projects) and exists for higher types.
4.2 Strategic product market competition
Another example of a real options signaling game in which asymmetric information delays
option exercise is the strategic entry into a product market. Specically, consider the entry
decisions of two rms that are asymmetrically informed about the value of a new product.
Firm 1 knows the investment cost , while rm 2 does not. For example, rm 1 may have
greater experience in similar product introductions or may be the industrys technology
leader. When there is only one rm in the industry, it receives a monopoly prot ow of P (t).
When there are two rms in the industry, each receives a duopoly prot ow of P (t), where
 2

1  1

; 1

.40 We derive the Bayes-Nash separating equilibrium in two di¤erent versions
of the game: when rm 1 is the designated leader (the Stackelberg equilibrium) and when
the roles of the two rms are determined endogenously (the Cournot equilibrium). We
focus on the limiting case  ! 0 to obtain the closed-form solutions.
Product market competition in a real options framework has been frequently analyzed
in the literature. Leahy (1993), Williams (1993), and Grenadier (2002) study simultaneous
investment by symmetric rms in a competitive equilibrium. Novy-Marx (2007) looks at a
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similar problem with heterogeneous rms. Grenadier (1996), Weeds (2002), and Lambrecht
and Perraudin (2003) study sequential investment in leader-follower games. We follow
the simple duopoly framework outlined in Chapter 9 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The
key distinction with the perfect information framework in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) is
that one rm knows the investment cost, while the other attempts to infer it through the
informed rms investment decision. The main insight is that the informed rm will delay
its investment to signal to the uniformed rm that the cost is higher than in reality, thereby
attempting to delay the uniformed rms entrance and enjoy monopoly prots for a longer
period. In equilibrium this e¤ort to deceive will fail, but the informed rms entry will still
be delayed relative to the full-information entry time.41
The investment decision of rm 1 depends on the degree of pressure it feels due to
rm 2s potential preemption. We will begin with the assumption of a Stackelberg equilib-
rium (where there is no potential preemption) and then show the extension to a Cournot
equilibrium (where preemption by rm 2 is possible).
4.2.1 The Stackelberg equilibrium
Let us work backwards and begin by considering the situation when rm 1 has already
invested. Firm 2 has used rm 1s entry time to make an inference about , denoted by
~. Given its inferred signal, rm 2 holds a standard real option whose expected payo¤ at
exercise is P
r    ~. Firm 2 will thus enter at the rst instant when P (t) equals or exceeds
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PF

~

, given by:
PF

~

=

   1
r   

~: (53)
Now, consider the entry of rm 1. Upon payment of  at exercise, rm 1 begins receiving
the monopoly prot ow of P (t), which is then reduced to P (t) once rm 2 enters. Thus,
for a given type , rm 2s belief ~, and the entry trigger P^L, the payo¤ to rm 1 at the
moment of entry is:
P^L
r      

P^L
PF (~)

PF (~)(1 )
r  ; for P^L  PF

~

;
P^L
r    ; for P^L > PF

~

:
(54)
Let PL () denote the equilibrium entry threshold of rm 1 in the Stackelberg case. Con-
jecture that PL ()  PF (), which is veried in Appendix B. Then, from (54) we can see
that the payo¤ from exercise can be written as:


P^L   

+W (P^L; ~; ); (55)
where  = 1
r  , and:
W (P^L; ~; ) =  P^ L (1  ) PF

~
1 
  (1  ) : (56)
Note that the belief component of this payo¤ is not a special case of the model outlined
in Section 1, given that P^L is included as an argument. In Appendix B, we show that this
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slight di¤erence in the functions can be easily handled, and that the separating equilibrium
investment trigger satises di¤erential equation (B15). The resulting leaders Stackelberg
strategy thus satises:
d PL ()
d
=
1  

 PL ()
 1
r 
PL ()  
 
PL ()

 1
r 


!
: (57)
Since the leaders payo¤ is decreasing in ~, it is solved subject to the boundary condition
that type  invests at the symmetric information threshold. In the limiting case  ! 0, this
boundary condition approaches:
PL (0) = 0: (58)
In Appendix B we show that the solution is:
PL () =

   1
r   

 = PF (): (59)
Thus, rm 1s Stackelberg strategy is to delay investment up to the point that rm 2s
response will be to invest immediately thereafter.
It is instructive to compare the equilibrium investment threshold of the leader (59)
with the fullinformation case studied in Chapter 9 in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), in which
both the leader and the follower know . In that case, the full-information Stackelberg
equilibrium investment threshold for rm 1 is equal to:42
P L () =

   1 (r   ) : (60)
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Since  < 1, rm 1s investment occurs later than in the full-information setting. Intuitively,
rm 1 has an incentive to invest later than in the case of symmetric information to fool rm
2 and thereby postpone its entry. As in the other applications, in equilibrium the informed
player is unsuccessful in fooling the uninformed player: rm 2 learns the true type of the
leader, and invests at the same investment threshold as in the case of perfect information.
Information asymmetry not only leads to later entry of rm 1 but also shortens the period
of time when rm 1 is a monopolist.
4.2.2 The Cournot equilibrium
Now, consider how the Stackelberg equilibrium of the previous section is a¤ected by the
potential preemption of rm 2. Let ~PL be the threshold at which rm 2 preempts rm 1 by
entering rst. In the event of being preempted, the optimal best response for rm 1 is to
invest at the rst time when P (t) equals or exceeds the optimal followers threshold PF ().
Given any preemption threshold, ~PL, we can compute the conditional expected value
of rm 2 before either rm invests. Let PM (t) denote the historical maximum of P (t)
as of time t. If rm 1 has not invested before time t, rm 2 learns that  is such that
PL () > PM (t), i.e.,  >
 1


r PM (t). There are two ranges of : in the upper range rm
2 enters rst, and in the lower range both rms enter simultaneously. For the case in which
 >  1


r 
~PL, ~PL < PL () and thus rm 2 preempts rm 1 by investing at ~PL. For the
case in which    1


r 
~PL, ~PL  PL () and thus rm 1 enters at the Stackelberg trigger
PL (), where rm 2 will then infer  and immediately enter. Combining these cases, rm
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2s value, conditional on P and PM , is equal to:
R  1


r  ~PL
 1


r PM

P
PF ()
 
PF ()
r    

()
1 ( 1 r PM)
d
+
R 
 1


r  ~PL

P
~PL
  ~PL
r   

~PL
PF ()

(1 )PF ()
r    

()
1 ( 1 r PM)
d:
(61)
The optimal preemption strategy is to invest at the ~PL that maximizes (61). The corre-
sponding rst-order condition is:43
~PL =

   1
E
h
j   1


r 
~PL
i
r    : (62)
In other words, the equilibrium preemption trigger equals the expected full-information
Stackelberg trigger, conditional on preemption. In Appendix B we show that the optimal
preemption threshold, ~PL, is always between 0 and PF
 


. In particular, assuming that
 () = (1   ()) is increasing in , equation (62) has a unique solution, which determines
~PL.44
We can now fully characterize the Cournot equilibrium outcome. Firm 2 attempts to
preempt rm 1 by investing at trigger ~PL, which is implicitly given by (62). If  is such
that ~PL < PL(), then rm 2 invests rst at ~PL, and rm 1 invests later at PF () = PL().
Alternatively, if  is such that ~PL  PL(), then both rms invest simultaneously at trigger
PL(). Thus, in all cases the informed rm invests later than it would in the case of full
information. This delay is due to its strategic incentive to articially inate rm 1s inferred
estimate of .
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The Cournot equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4, for the case in which  is distrib-
uted uniformly over [0; 2]. The preemption threshold, ~PL, is equal to 0:085. At the point
designated A where  = 0:5, the Stackelberg trigger PF () is equal to ~PL. Thus for all
 > 0:5, the equilibrium outcome is for rm 2 to invest rst at trigger ~PL and for rm 1
to invest later at the Stackelberg trigger PF (). Conversely, for all   0:5, there will be
simultaneous entry at the Stackelberg trigger PF ().
5 Conclusion
This paper studies real options signaling games. These are games in which the decision to
exercise an option is a signal of private information to outsiders, whose beliefs a¤ect the
payo¤ of the decision maker. The decision maker attempts to fool outsiders by altering the
timing of option exercise. In equilibrium, signal-jamming occurs: outsiders infer private
information of the decision maker correctly, but the timing of the option exercise is signif-
icantly distorted. The distortion can go in both directions. If the decisionmakers payo¤
increases in outsidersbelief about the value of the asset, then signaling incentives speed
up option exercise. Conversely, if the decisionmakers payo¤ decreases in outsidersbelief
about the value of the asset, then signaling incentives delay option exercise.
We illustrate the ndings of the general model using four corporate nance applications:
investment under managerial myopia, venture capital grandstanding, investment under cash
ow diversion by the manager, and product market entry decisions by two asymmetrically
informed rms. The rst two applications provide examples in which signaling erodes
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the value of the option to wait and speeds up investment. In the rst application, the
manager cares not only about the long-term performance of the company but also about
the short-term stock price. In attempt to boost the short-term stock price, the manager
invests too early attempting to fool the market into overestimating the projects NPV. In
the second application, we consider the decision when to take the company public by a
venture capitalist, who is better informed about its value than are outside investors. Here,
a venture capitalist with a short track record takes their portfolio companies public earlier
in an attempt to establish a reputation and raise more capital for new funds. The last
two applications provide examples in which signaling incentives delay investment. First,
signaling can signicantly delay investment if the agent can divert cash ows from the
project for her own private benet. In this case investment is delayed as the agent tries to
signal that the NPV of the project is lower than in reality, thereby diverting more for her
personal consumption. Second, we illustrate how signaling delays investment in a duopoly,
where the rms are asymmetrically informed about the value of a new product. In this case,
the informed rms decision when to launch the new product reveals information about its
value to the uninformed rm and thereby potentially impacting future competition. The
informed rm delays the decision to launch the product in attempt to fool the rival into
underestimating the value of the product.
Irrespective of the application, the main message of the paper is the same: signaling
incentives have an important role in distorting major timing decisions of rms such as
investment in large projects, IPOs, and developing new products. This gives rise to several
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interesting questions that are left outside of this paper. For example, to what extent do the
existing contracts provide incentives to make the timing decisions optimally? As another
example, in what applications do signaling incentives work for or against social welfare?
While signaling incentives reduce the decisionmakers utility due to an ine¢ cient timing
of option exercise, their e¤ect on the social welfare is unclear.
Appendix
Appendix A. Single-Crossing Condition
We list the single-crossing condition, which is used to obtain existence and uniqueness of
the separating equilibrium.
Assumption 5 (Single-crossing condition). Function W

~; 

satises:
W~

~; 


@

UP^ (~;;P^)
U~(~;;P^)

@
> 0 (A1)
for

~; P^

in the graph of P , where U

~; ; P^

is given by (13),  is given by (7), and P ()
is the unique increasing solution of the di¤erential equation (16), subject to the boundary
condition (17), if W~

~; 

< 0, or (18), if W~

~; 

> 0.
The single-crossing condition ensures that if the agent does not make extra gains by
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misrepresenting  slightly, then extra gains cannot be made from a large misrepresentation.
It is standard for games of asymmetric information, both signaling and screening. Impor-
tantly, it is enough that the single-crossing condition is satised for

~; P^

in the graph of
P .
The single-crossing condition holds in all applications that we consider. As an example,
below we verify the single-crossing condition for the venture capital grandstanding example
of Section 3.2. For this application, we have from (42):
W

~; 

= 
P2 ()  
P2 ()

H

I2

~

; (A2)
where H 0 > 0; I 02 < 0, and P2 () is the full-information trigger in (37). Simplifying, we
have:
W

~; 

= k1 H

I2

~

; (A3)
where k = 
 1


 1
 
> 0. Taking derivatives, we obtain that Assumption 5 requires
that:
(   1) P^  1    +

 1

 1
H

I2

~

P^~
 1 1
1 I
0
2

~
 (A4)
is a strictly decreasing function of  for

~; P^

in the graph of P1. Taking the derivative
with respect to , we get the following requirement:
(   1)2 P^   2 < 0 for P^ in the graph of P1. (A5)
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In the graph of P1, the highest value of P^ is P1
 


, which is given by (45). Therefore, a
su¢ cient condition for (A5) is:
(   1)2 P1
 

  2 < 0: (A6)
This is equivalent to (43) in Section 3.2. Hence, the single-crossing condition is veried.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. We apply Theorems 1-3 from Mailath (1987) to prove the
proposition. We need to show that function U

~; ; P^

satises Mailaths (1987) regularity
conditions:
 Smoothness: U

~; ; P^

is C2 on

; 
2  R+;
 Belief monotonicity: U~ never equals zero, and so is either positive or negative;
 Type monotonicity: UP^ never equals zero, and so is either positive or negative;
 Strictquasiconcavity: UP^

; ; P^

= 0 has a unique solution in P^ , which maximizes
U

; ; P^

, and UP^ P^

; ; P^

< 0 at this solution;
 Boundedness: There exists  > 0 such that for all

; P^

2 ; R+ UP^ P^ ; ; P^ 
0 )
UP^ ; ; P^ > .
Let us check that these conditions are satised for our problem. The smoothness con-
dition is satised, because W

~; 

is C2 on

; 
2
. The belief monotonicity condition is
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satised, because W~ is either always positive or always negative. The type monotonicity
condition is satised, because:
UP^

~; ; P^

=


 W

~; 

P^ +1
> 0; (B1)
as  > W

~; 

by Assumption 4. As we show in Section 1.3, UP^

; ; P^

= 0 has a
unique solution in P^ , denoted by P  (), that maximizes U

; ; P^

. Also:
UP^ P^ (; ; P
 ()) =

P  ()+2
[ (   1)P  ()  ( + 1) (  W (; ))] (B2)
=   (  W (; ))
P  ()+2
< 0:
Hence, the strictquasiconcavity condition is satised. Finally, to ensure that the bound-
edness condition is satised, we restrict the set of potential investment thresholds to be
bounded by k from above, where k can be arbitrarily large. We will later show that
extending the set of actions to P^ 2 (0;1) neither destroys the separating equilibrium
nor creates additional separating equilibria. Notice that UP^ P^

; ; P^

 0 implies that
   W (; )  P^ (   1) = ( + 1). Hence, for any

; P^

2 ;   [0; k] such that
UP^ P^

; ; P^

 0:
UP^ ; ; P^ = ( 1)P^ ( W (;))P^+1  ( 1)P^ ( 1)+1 P^P^+1 = ( 1)(+1)P^  ( 1)(+1)k > 0 (B3)
for any arbitrarily large k. Then, the boundedness condition is satised.
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By Mailaths (1987) Theorems 1 and 2, any separating equilibrium P () is continuous,
di¤erentiable, satises equation (16), and d P=d has the same sign as UP^ . Because UP^ > 0,
P () is an increasing function of . Let ~P denote the solution to the following restricted
initial value problem: equation (16), subject to (17), if W~ < 0, or (18), if W~ > 0.
Because jW~ (; )j is bounded above by max2[;] jW~ (; )j, ~P is unique by Mailaths
(1987) Proposition 5. Hence, if a separating equilibrium exists, it is unique and is given by
~P . By Mailaths (1987) Theorem 3, the single-crossing condition guarantees existence of
the separating equilibrium.
This argument suggests that ~P is the unique separating equilibrium in a problem where
the set of investment thresholds is P^ 2 (0; k) for any su¢ ciently large nite k. Finally, it
remains to show that considering the space of investment thresholds bounded by k is not
restrictive. First, we argue that ~P is a separating equilibrium in a problem where P^ 2
(0;+1). To show this, note that the single-crossing condition holds for all P^ 2 (0;+1).
Therefore, local incentive compatibility guarantees global incentive compatibility for all
P^ 2 (0;+1), not only for P^ 2 (0; k). Hence, ~P is a separating equilibrium in a problem
where P^ 2 (0;+1). Second, we argue that there are no other separating equilibria in
a problem where P^ 2 (0;+1). By contradiction, suppose that there is an additional
separating equilibrium ~P2, other than ~P . It must be the case that for some , ~P2 () is
innite. Otherwise, it would be a separating equilibrium in the restricted problem for a
su¢ ciently large k. However, if ~P2 () is innite for some , then the equilibrium expected
payo¤ of type  is zero. Hence, it would be optimal for this type to deviate to any nite
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P^ >    max~W

~; 

=. Thus, there are no other separating equilibria in a problem
where P^ 2 (0;+1).
Proof of Proposition 3. We can rewrite equation (16) in the following form:
 (   1) P ()   (  W (; )) =
P ()W~ (; )
P 0 ()
: (B4)
From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that P 0 () > 0. Hence, if W~ < 0, then the
right-hand side of (B4) is negative. Thus, (B4) implies that P () < P  () except the point
 =  in which the initial value condition holds. Analogously, ifW~ > 0, then the right-hand
side of (B4) is positive, so (B4) implies that P () > P  () except the point  =  in which
the initial value condition holds.
Derivation of the semi-pooling equilibrium. First, we show that for any ^ 2  ; ,
equation (26) has the unique solution denoted Ppool

^

. Consider function:
f

P ; ^

=
 
P
P (^)
!


P (^)  ^

  

P   ^

+ cw
^   
2
; (B5)
dened over P 2
h
0; P

^
i
, ^ 2  ; . Note that:
f

P

^

; ^

= cw
^   
2
< 0; (B6)
f

0; ^

= ^ + cw
^   
2
> 0; (B7)
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where the rst inequality holds by cw < 0 and the second inequality holds by Assumption
2. Consider the derivative of f

P ; ^

with respect to P :
f P

P ; ^

= 
0@ P
P

^

1A  P (^)  ^
P
  
 
P (^)  ^
P

^
    (B8)
<  (   1)   ^
P 

^
 = 0:
The rst inequality follows from P  P

^

and fPP

P ; ^

> 0. The second inequality
follows from P

^

< P 

^

. By continuity of f

P ; ^

, for any ^ there exists a unique
point in Ppool

^

at which f

Ppool

^

; ^

= 0.
Second, we demonstrate that each type  2
h
; ^
i
indeed nds it optimal to exercise
at Ppool

^

and each type  2
h
^; 
i
nds it optimal to exercise at P (). Consider type
 2
h
^; 
i
. The di¤erence of the utilities from separating at P () and pooling is equal to:

Ppool
P ()


 
P ()     (Ppool   ) + cw ^   
2
(B9)
= P pool max
Y 2R+

1
Y 
 
 (Y   ) +W   P 1 (Y ) ;    (Ppool   ) + cw ^   
2
:
By the envelope theorem, the derivative with respect to  is:

Ppool
P ()

(   cw) +   0; (B10)
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because cw < 0 and Ppool  P (). Because type ^ is indi¤erent between separating and
pooling, any type  above ^ does not have an incentive to deviate to Ppool. By the single-
crossing condition, any deviation to a threshold that is di¤erent from Ppool is also not
optimal for any type  2
h
^; 
i
. Consider type  2
h
; ^
i
. From (B9), the payo¤ of
type  from pooling and investing at Ppool is higher than P

poolU

~; ; P^

. By the single-
crossing condition, U
 
; ; P ()
  U ~; ; P ~. Therefore, under the worst-possible
out-of-equilibrium beliefs, no type  2
h
; ^
i
nds it optimal to deviate from Ppool.
Proof that the form of the optimal verication threshold, v

P; ~

, is P   ~   v
for some constant v. Suppose that the managers type is , and the shareholders
belief is ~. Let v

P; ~

denote the more general verication threshold of the sharehold-
ers such that shareholders verify the manager if and only if the realized value is below
v

P; ~

. Then, if the manager of type  diverts d, she expects to be veried with proba-
bility 	

v

P; ~

  P +  + d

. Hence, the managers problem is:
max
d0
n
(  ) d

1 	

v

P; ~

  P +  + d
o
: (B11)
The solution is a function of P      v

P; ~

, denoted by D

P      v

P; ~

.
Given the managers response to a verication rule v

P; ~

, we now derive the optimal
v

P; ~

. The shareholders expect the manager to divert D

P   ~   v

, so they estimate
the probability of verication at 	

v   P + ~ +D

P   ~   v

. Hence, for each P and
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~, v

P; ~

must minimize:
(1  )D

P   ~   v

1 	

v   P + ~ +D

P   ~   v

+c	

v   P + ~ +D

P   ~   v

: (B12)
Since the value function depends on v, P , and ~ only through v   P + ~, any optimal
verication threshold is of the form v

P; ~

= P   ~   v for some constant v.
Verication of PL ()  PF (). By contradiction, suppose that in equilibrium PL () >
PF () for some . If rm 1 invests at P^L  PF

~

, rm 2 will invest immediately after
rm 1. Hence, in the range P^L  PF

~

, P < P^L, VL

P; ; ~; P^L

is equal to:
VL

P; ; ~; P^L

=

P
P^L
  
P^L
r      
!
: (B13)
Irrespective of ~, this value function is maximized at P^L = PF (). Hence, any PL () >
PF () is inconsistent with equilibrium.
Generalizing the payo¤ function to W (P; ~; ). The equilibrium di¤erential equation
in (16) can be generalized to the case in which the belief function also includes P as an
argument. Provided that the payo¤ function satises the regularity condition in Mailath
(1987), as does the particular function in (55) - (56), the equilibrium derivation can proceed
as follows. Analogous to (15), the agents rst-order condition for the optimal selection of
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the trigger P^ is:




P^   

+W

P^ ; P 1

P^

; 

P^
= +WP

P^ ; P 1

P^

; 

+W~

P^ ; P 1

P^

; 
 d P 1 P^
dP^
: (B14)
In the separating equilibrium, we can set P 1

P^

=  and obtain the equilibrium di¤er-
ential equation:
d P ()
d
=
P ()W~
 
P () ; ; 


 
(   1) P ()  + W   P () ; ;   P ()WP   P () ; ;  : (B15)
Solution to di¤erential equation (57) subject to boundary condition (58). Let
us look for a solution in the form PL () = A. Notice that this solution will satisfy the
boundary condition (58) since PL (0) = 0. Equation (57) becomes:
A
   1
(r   )  

A (   1)
 (r   )

1  

= 1: (B16)
Letting v  A ( 1)
(r ) , we get:
v   v     1  v = 0: (B17)
Let (v) = v   v     1  v. It is clear that v = 1 is a root of (v). Since 00(v) =
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 (   1) (  1) v 2 < 0 and (0) =   < 0, (v) has at most one other root. We have
lim
v!1
(v) =  1, and since  > 1   1

, 0(1) > 0. Thus, there exists the second root, and
it exceeds 1. The upper root cannot yield the separating equilibrium since it implies the
investment threshold above PF (), which is inconsistent with the separating equilibrium,
as shown above. Hence, (57) - (58) is solved by:
PL () =

   1
r   

: (B18)
Proof of properties of ~PL. The rst derivative of (61) with respect to ~PL equals:
 E
"
P
~PL

1
~PL
 
(   1) ~PL
r      
!
j   ~PL
#
=

P
~PL

1
~PL
 
E
h
j   ~PL
i
  (   1)
~PL
r   
!
; (B19)
where  =  1


r  . It is strictly positive for all
~PL su¢ ciently close to 0 and strictly
negative for all ~PL su¢ ciently close to PF
 


. Hence, (61) is maximized at ~PL 2
 
0; PF
 


.
Therefore, the sets
n
 : PF () > ~PL
o
and
n
 : PF () < ~PL
o
are nonempty.
Consider the case when  () = (1   ()) is increasing in . First, we show that e () 
E


 j  

is strictly decreasing in . Taking the derivative:
e0 () = e ()

 () 
1   ()   1

   (
) 
1   () : (B20)
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Clearly, e () is strictly decreasing in  for all points below the point at which 
()
1 () = 1.
Consider the range above this point. If e0 () > 0 for some , then it must be the case
that e0 () > 0 for all  above. This implies 1 = e
 


> e (), which is a contradiction
with e () for all  < . Hence, e () is strictly decreasing in . Now, consider (62). We
can rewrite it as:
E


 ~PL
j   ~PL

=
1

; (B21)
where    1


r  . Notice that the left-hand side approaches innity when
~PL approaches
zero and equals 1 < 1

when ~PL = = = PF
 


. Because E
h

 ~PL
j   ~PL
i
is decreasing
in ~PL, there exists the unique ~PL 2
 
0; PF
 


at which (62) is satised.
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Notes
1The early literature, started by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel
(1986), is well summarized in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Recently the real options frame-
work has been extended to incorporate competition among several option holders (e.g.,
Grenadier 2002; Lambrecht and Perraudin 2003; Novy-Marx 2007) and agency conicts
(Grenadier and Wang 2005). Real options models have been applied to study specic in-
dustries such as real estate (Titman 1985; Williams 1991) and natural resources (Brennan
and Schwartz 1985) and other corporate decisions such as defaults (e.g., Leland 1994) and
mergers (Lambrecht 2004; Morellec and Zhdanov 2005; Hackbarth and Morellec 2008; Hack-
barth and Miao 2011). See Leslie and Michaels (1997) for a discussion of how practitioners
use real options ideas.
2See Tirole (2006), Chapter 6, for a discussion of asymmetric information in corporate
nance.
3In fact, as we discuss in Section 2.4, any non-separating equilibrium can be ruled out
using the D1 restriction on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of outsiders.
4Our application on cash ow diversion is also related to Grenadier and Wang (2005) and
Bouvard (2010), who study investment timing under asymmetric information between the
manager and investors, where the timing of investment can be part of the contract between
the parties. The major di¤erence between their models and our diversion application is
that theirs are screening models, while ours is a signaling model.
5See McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Chapter 5 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a
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discussion of this restriction. Instead of risk neutrality, we could assume that P (t) evolves
as (1) under the risk-neutral measure.
6The assumption that the privately observable component of the project is the invest-
ment cost is without loss of generality. The model can also be formulated when the privately
observable component  corresponds to part of the projects present value rather than the
investment cost [as in Grenadier and Wang (2005)] or when it a¤ects the present value of
the project multiplicatively [as in Bustamante (2011) and Morellec and Schürho¤ (2011)].
7We introduce the noise term to make the timing of exercise a meaningful signal of the
agents private information. If " were always equal to zero, then outsiders would be able to
learn the exact value of  from observing the realized value of the project. As a consequence,
the timing of exercise would have no information role. Because of risk neutrality, as long as
there is some noise, its distribution is not important for our results with the exception of the
model in Section 4.1, where its distribution impacts the underlying costly state verication
model.
8See Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Philippon and Sannikov (2007) for optimal con-
tracting problems in the real options context.
9The form of the utility function from exercise in (3) is chosen to both keep the model
tractable and su¢ ciently general. We have also solved the model for an even more general
utility function,  (F (P ())   + ") +W

P () ; ~; 

. The results are very similar, as
long as the utility function satises the regularity conditions in Mailath (1987).
10If neither the agent nor outsiders observe , then the model is analogous to the one in
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this section.
11Since P = 0 is an absorbing barrier, V  (P; ) must also satisfy the condition V  (0; ) =
0.
12Note that outsiders also learn from observing that the agent has not yet exercised the
option. Specically, whenever P (t) hits a new maximum, outsiders update their belief of
the agents type. If PM (t) = maxst P (s), outsidersposterior belief is the prior belief
truncated at P 1 (PM (t)) from below (above), if P () is increasing (decreasing) in . Once
the agent exercises the option at P^ , outsidersposterior belief jumps to P 1

P^

. Because
only outsidersbelief upon option exercise enters the payo¤ function of the agent, we can
disregard the pre-exercise dynamics of outsidersbelief.
13As in the symmetric information case, the option value must satisfy the absorbing
barrier condition V (0; ~; ) = 0.
14Our model assumes that outsidersactions impact the agents payo¤ only through the
belief component, ~. As discussed in Mailath (1987), this is the reduced-form specication
that incorporates optimal (with respect to the given belief) actions of outsiders, which are
taken after the agent exercises the option. Thus, the harshest punishment that can be
inicted on the agent is the belief that she is the worst possible type.
15An example of such function that satises Assumptions 1 - 5 is w

~   

= cw 
~   

, where cw is any non-zero constant above  .
16To see this, note that Assumption 4 and w0 (0) < 0 imply that  
w0(0) 1 > 0. Therefore,
as  !1, the left-hand side converges to P ().
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17More generally, the belief component can be any function of the distribution of out-
sidersposterior belief about the agents type.
18This result holds because for any ^, the boundary condition is the same and is deter-
mined by type . Note that in the case of W~ > 0, this result does not hold, because the
boundary conditions are di¤erent: in this semi-separating equilibrium it is determined by
type ^, while in the separating equilibrium it is determined by type .
19See Cho and Kreps (1987), Cho and Sobel (1990), or Ramey (1996) for a formal den-
ition.
20Specically, unlike in Ramey (1996), the space of actions in our model is bounded from
below and the agents payo¤ converges to zero as the action converges to innity.
21One can motivate this split between the current and long-term stock price as dealing
with option vesting schedules, limits on stock sales of executives (either contractual, or
determined by the informational costs of trading), or the expected tenure of the managers
a¢ liation with the rm.
22We assume that outsiders do not observe whether the manager sells the stock or not.
We make this assumption to make the application simple and tractable. One can get similar
results in a more realistic setting, in which outsiders observe the managers sale decision,
as long as it does not reveal the managers private information perfectly: for example, if
the manager sells stock with positive probability for an exogenous reason.
23As we shall see below, managers with su¢ ciently high  choose to sell all shares prior
to investment, in which case the stock component of utility disappears.
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24Note that  1min

~   ; 0

has a kink at ~ = . However, this does not create
problems, because only the region  > ~ is important for the incentives: clearly, no
type wants to mimic a type above. Hence, the problem is equivalent to a problem with
W

~; 

=  1

~   

. Note that this function W

~; 

satises Assumptions 1 - 5, as
argued in footnote 15.
25To ensure that none of the types invest immediately, we assume that P (0) < P ():
26Previous research (Williams 1993; Grenadier 2002) has demonstrated that the value
of the option to invest can be signicantly eroded because of competitive pressure in the
industry. This application shows that if a portion of the managers utility comes from
the short-term stock price, then the value of the option to invest can be eroded even in
monopolistic industries, as long as the manager is better informed about the investment
project than the market.
27The model can be extended to a more realistic, albeit less tractable, setting in which
the rm has imperfect knowledge of its ability. This extended model has similar results and
intuition, as long as the rm is better informed about its ability than investors.
28For purposes of this application, we take the compensation structure of the general
partner as given. This structure is quite similar to the observed industry practice (e.g.,
Metrick and Yasuda 2010).
29Because of this normalization, we assume that the parameters of the model are such
that P () > 1.
30For simplicity, we assume that the skill parameter  of the VC rm is the same in both
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rounds. The model can be extended to the case of di¤erent, but correlated skill levels across
rounds. In such a case, in equilibrium the timing of investment is an imperfect rather than
perfect signal about the general partners talent.
31Note that if the limited partners observe the proceeds from the rst round, then they
may also use this information to infer . However, this does not a¤ect the model, because
the proceeds are a noisier signal of the rms private information than the timing. Indeed,
the proceeds reveal the value of   "1, while the timing in a separating equilibrium reveals
.
32It can be easily checked that function W

~; 

in this application also satises As-
sumptions 1 - 4, provided that the optimal IPO threshold in the rst round in the case of
symmetric information is nite.
33To ensure that none of the types does an IPO immediately, we make an assumption that
the initial value P (0) is below P1 (). Then, the unique separating equilibrium investment
threshold is dened as an increasing function, which solves (44) subject to (45).
34We take the structure of the managers compensation contract as given. In a more
general model, the managers ownership stake could itself be endogenous.
35We make an assumption that the manager is not allowed to inject their own funds into
the rm. This assumption simplies the solution but is not critical, as long as injection is
not too protable.
36The model can be extended by allowing the shareholders to impose a non-pecuniary
cost on the manager if diversion is veried.
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37While we assume that the proceeds from the project realize an instant after the invest-
ment has been made, the model can be extended to include the time to build feature (e.g.,
as in Majd and Pindyck 1987).
38Technically, the manager is indi¤erent in her choice of d when  = . However, if there
is any innitesimal but positive xed cost of diversion, a zero level will be chosen.
39For P () to correspond to the separating equilibrium, we need to ensure that the para-
meters of the application satisfy Assumption 5. A su¢ cient condition is  >
h
maxz2[ ; ]
w00(z)
w0(z)
i

 1

 P
 

   + w        w0     . Analogously to (43), this condition is always
satised if the interval

; 

is not too wide. Assumptions 1 - 4 are always satised by
W

~; 

in this application, as long as P  () > 0, as given below.
40Essentially, the assumption that  > 1   1

rules out any overwhelming inuence of
monopoly power.
41Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) and Hsu and Lambrecht (2007) are also related to
the model in this section. They study competition between two rms for an investment
opportunity when the information structure is imperfect. In Lambrecht and Perraudin
(2003), each rm knows its own investment cost but not the cost of its competitor. In Hsu
and Lambrecht (2007), the investment cost of one rm (the incumbent) is public knowledge,
while the investment cost of the other rm is known only to itself.
42The intuition for this result is as follows. The leader never enters after PF (), since
in this region there is always simultaneous entry, and PF () is the optimal trigger for
simultaneous entry. Since the leader knows that the follower enters at PF () and that at
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that point it will lose the di¤erence between the monopoly value and the duopoly value, its
entry time choice will be the one that maximizes its monopoly value: P L().
43Note that if  is such that PL () > ~PL, it is not optimal for rm 1 to preempt rm
2 by investing at a threshold below ~PL. Indeed, if rm 1 invested at P^ < ~PL, rm 2
would respond by investing immediately after rm 1 as it would perceive that  is such that
PL () = PF () = P^ . As a result, rm 1 does not gain any monopoly power from investing
below ~PL, so its best response to the preemptive strategy of rm 2 is to invest at PF ().
44Intuitively, this assumption means that the density of distribution does not have abrupt
kinks. It is satised for most standard distributions.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium investment threshold of a myopic manager. The left graph
shows the equilibrium investment trigger as a function of the investment cost  for three
di¤erent values of 1= (1 + 2), as well as the benchmark case. The top curve corresponds
to the investment threshold P  () when there is no incentives for signaling. The other
curves correspond (from top to bottom) to the cases when the manager can freely sell 25%,
50%, and 75% of her shares, respectively. The right graph shows the corresponding option
premium as a function of the investment cost . The parameter values of the project value
process are r = 0:04,  = 0:02,  = 0:2. The investment costs are distributed uniformly
over [1; 2].
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Figure 2. Exit strategies of the inexperienced general partner. The left graph
shows the equilibrium trigger, P1 (), and the symmetric information trigger, P 1 (), as
functions of  (higher  corresponds to lower talent). The right graph shows the ratio of the
two triggers, P1 () = P 1 (). The production function is the power function: H (I) = AI
2=3.
The parameter values of the price process are r = 0:04,  = 0:02,  = 0:2. The interval
of possible types is

; 

= [1; 2]. The share of the IPO proceeds that goes to the general
partner is  = 0:2. The value of A is calibrated at A = 3:015 so that for the middle type
 = 1:5 the equilibrium investment into the second project equals the investment into the
rst project, i.e., F (I2 ()) = 1.
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Figure 3. Investment threshold when the manager can divert cash ows from
the project. The gure shows the equilibrium investment thresholds as a function of the
investment cost  for two di¤erent levels of the diversion parameter : 0 and 0.75. The
bottom curve for this case corresponds to the investment threshold P  () when there is
symmetric information between the manager and the market. The top curve for this case
corresponds to the investment threshold P () in the unique separating equilibrium when
there is asymmetric information between the manager and the market. The parameter
values of the project value process are r = 0:04,  = 0:02,  = 0:2. The managerial
ownership is  = 0:2. The interval of possible investment costs is [1; 2]. The distribution of
noise " is N (0; 1). The cost of verication is c = 1.
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Figure 4. Equilibrium investment thresholds in the Stackelberg and Cournot
equilibria. The gure shows the equilibrium investment triggers of rm 1 and rm 2 in the
Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria. The lower line corresponds to the investment threshold
of the leader (rm 1) in the Stackelberg equilibrium when both the leader and the follower
know . The upper line corresponds to the investment thresholds of both rm 1 and rm
2 in the Stackelberg equilibrium when only the leader knows . Point A corresponds to
the preemption threshold in the Cournot equilibrium. If   0:5, then the outcome in the
Cournot equilibrium is the same as in the Stackelberg equilibrium. If  > 0:5, then in the
Cournot equilibrium rm 2 invests rst. The parameter values of the project value process
are r = 0:04,  = 0:02,  = 0:2. The competition parameter is  = 0:4. The investment
costs, , are distributed uniformly over [0; 2].
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